The BRICS – merely a fable?:Emerging power alliances in global trade governance by Hopewell, Kristen
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The BRICS – Merely a Fable?
Citation for published version:
Hopewell, K 2017, 'The BRICS – Merely a Fable? Emerging Power Alliances in Global Trade Governance',
International affairs, vol. 93, no. 6, pp. 1377–1396. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix192
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1093/ia/iix192
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
International affairs
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in International Affairs
following peer review. The version of record Kristen Hopewell; The BRICS—merely a fable? Emerging power
alliances in global trade governance, International Affairs, Volume 93, Issue 6, 1 November 2017, Pages
1377–1396 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix192
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 02. Jan. 2020
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The BRICS – Merely a Fable?  
 
Emerging Power Alliances in Global Trade Governance * 
 
 
 
 
Kristen Hopewell 
Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy 
University of Edinburgh 
18 Buccleuch Place, 4.03  
Edinburgh EH8 9LN 
kristen.hopewell@ed.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Abstract:  The much hyped rise of the “BRICS” (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa) has lately been met with equally fervent declarations of their demise.  Amid slowing 
growth in many of these countries, the prevailing view now appears to be that the rise of the 
BRICS was little more than an illusion.  In this article, however, I contest this assessment by 
arguing that the emerging powers were never solely, nor most importantly, merely an 
economic phenomenon.  Instead, I show that emerging powers – specifically Brazil, India and 
China – have become an important political force in the global trading system and had a 
profound and lasting impact on the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Contrary to the 
widespread assumption that these countries are too diverse to ally, I argue that the emerging 
powers displayed a remarkable degree of unity and cooperation, working in close concert to 
successfully challenge the dominance of the US and other established powers.  As evidenced 
by the collapse of the Doha Round, the collective rise of Brazil, India and China substantially 
disrupted the functioning of one of the core institutions of the liberal economic order created 
under US hegemony.   
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Introduction 
The rise – and, more recently, purported fall – of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa) has been among the most prominent stories of recent decades.  The 
concept of the BRICS originated as a marketing tool designed by an investment bank:  in 
2001, a Goldman Sachs report highlighted the rapid economic growth in the BRIC countries 
and their increasing weight in the global economy, projecting that they would eventually 
overtake the established economic powers.1  This prompted a flood of new BRICs investment 
funds and an explosion of interest in the BRICs.  Much of the discussion to date has thus 
been dominated by what could be called the Goldman Sachs view of the BRICS – as 
primarily an economic phenomenon, centered on rapid economic growth in these countries 
and resulting opportunities for investment.2  Consequently, now that growth has slowed in 
many of the BRICS – with China’s growth falling from double-digits to less than 7 percent, 
and Brazil and Russia currently in recession – the frenzy surrounding the rise of the BRICS 
has been replaced by equally fervent declarations of their demise.  In a reversal of earlier 
fantastical predictions that these countries would ‘power an unstoppable wave of emerging 
markets-led economic growth’, many now conclude that slowing growth means ‘the BRICs 
are dead’.3  Goldman Sachs generated a fresh storm of attention when it closed its BRIC fund 
in 2015 after sustained losses and folded it into its larger emerging market fund.  The media 
is replete with declarations that the BRICS are ‘broken’ and ‘the BRIC era [has] come to an 
end’.4  In short, as Michael Mandelbaum puts it, ‘the darlings of the global economy’ have 
‘fallen from grace’.5 
1 Goldman Sachs excluded South Africa; ‘S’ was added when South Africa joined the BRIC(S) Summits in 
2010. 
2 Andrew Cooper, The BRICS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
3 Steve Johnson, ‘The Brics are dead’, Financial Times, January 28, 2016. 
4 Ruchir Sharma, ‘Broken BRICs,’ Foreign Affairs, November/December 2012; Ye Xie,’Goldman's BRIC era 
ends’, Bloomberg, November 8, 2015. 
5 Michael Mandelbaum, ‘BRIC bust?’ American Interest 9:5, 2014. 
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Many academics have been skeptical of the BRICS concept from the start.6  There has 
been considerable debate about whether the BRICS are meaningful from the perspective of 
international political economy, or merely a ‘mirage’.7  According to Harsh Pant, ‘The 
narrative surrounding the rise of BRICS is as exaggerated as that of the decline of the United 
States. … BRICS will remain an artificial construct – merely an acronym coined by an 
investment banking analyst – for quite some time to come.’8  A report from the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies maintains that ‘the foundation of the BRICS concept is 
beginning to crumble’ as the economic boom that buoyed these countries wanes, 
exacerbating the ‘conflicting interests and indisputable political, social and cultural 
differences’ that have ‘kept the BRICS from translating their economic force into collective 
power on the global stage’.9  Many thus dismiss the BRICS as a ‘fable’ or a ‘fallacy’ that was 
‘overhyped from the start’.10 
In this article, however, I argue that the emerging powers were never solely, nor most 
importantly, a purely economic phenomenon.  Equally, if not more, important has been their 
political impact on the governance of the global economy.  In the case of the global trading 
system, the impact of emerging powers – specifically Brazil, India and China – has been 
profound.  Contrary to what is commonly assumed, despite their diverse and at times 
conflicting interests, these three countries displayed a high degree of unity and cooperation in 
multilateral trade negotiations.  Brazil, India and China worked together in concert, and with 
backing from much of the developing world, to oppose the longstanding dominance of the 
US and other developed countries.  Emerging power alliances were critical in challenging the 
6 Cooper, The BRICS. 
7 Leslie Armijo, ‘The BRICS countries as analytical category: mirage or insight?’ Asian Perspective 31:4, 2007, 
pp. 7-42. 
8 Harsh V. Pant, ‘The BRICS fallacy’, The Washington Quarterly 36:3, 2013, pp. 91-105. 
9 Marcos Degaut and Carl Meacham, ‘Do the BRICS still matter?’ CSIS, 2015, p. iv. 
10 Immanual Wallerstein, ‘The BRICS - a fable for our time’, Commentary No. 416, 2016; Pant, ‘The BRICS 
fallacy’. 
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traditional structure of power within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and transformed 
the Doha Round of trade negotiations into a battle drawn along North-South lines.  Their 
alliances proved remarkably durable – capable of withstanding considerable pressure from 
the US and other established powers – and highly consequential.  As evident in the collapse 
of the Doha Round, the rise of the emerging powers substantially disrupted the functioning of 
a core institution of the US-led liberal economic order.  Far from merely a mirage or passing 
fad, Brazil, India and China collectively emerged as a major political-economic force at the 
WTO and have had a significant impact on global trade governance. 
Do the BRICS Matter? 
The institutions governing the global economy have been historically dominated by 
the US and other Western states.  Recently, however, there have been reforms to give greater 
weight to the BRICS and other emerging economies, including the replacement of the G8 by 
the G20 as the primary forum for international economic cooperation and the redistribution of 
voting shares at the IMF and World Bank.11  The BRICS have also come together as a 
political grouping, holding BRICS Summits since 2009 and creating institutions like the New 
Development Bank.  For some, the rise of the BRICS signals a shift away from Western 
dominance of the global order,12 while others are skeptical that there has been a meaningful 
shift in power, arguing that such changes have been more symbolic than real.  Many scholars 
have questioned the impact of the BRICS as a political force, maintaining that their influence 
in multilateral economic institutions remains small and they have yet to exercise a strong 
voice, become a source of initiative or play a significant agenda-setting role.13  Many also 
11 Andrew Cooper, ‘The G20 as an improvised crisis committee and/or a contested ‘steering committee’ for the 
world,’ International Affairs 86:3, 2010, pp.741–57; Peter Ferdinand and Jue Wang, ‘China and the IMF: from 
mimicry towards pragmatic international institutional pluralism,’ International Affairs 89:4, 2013, pp.895-910. 
12 Amitav Acharya, The end of American world order (Cambridge: Polity, 2014); Greg Chin, ‘Remaking the 
architecture: the emerging powers, self-insuring and regional insulation’, International Affairs 86:3, 2010, 
pp.693-715; Cooper, The BRICS; Oliver Stuenkel, Post-Western World (Cambridge: Polity, 2016). 
13 Robert Wade and Jakob Vestergaard, ‘Why is the IMF at an impasse, and what can be done about it?’ Global 
Policy 6:3, 2015; Paola Subacchi, ‘New power centres and new power brokers: are they shaping a new 
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reject the notion that American hegemony is waning and argue that the US and other Western 
states maintain their dominance in the international economic order.14  It is thus widely 
believed that the emerging economies have been unable to translate their economic might 
into effective political influence in global economic governance. 
The purported failure of the emerging powers to exercise influence is frequently 
attributed to a lack of unity.  Skeptics contend that, as Cynthia Roberts states, the BRICS ‘are 
simply too diverse to achieve meaningful cooperation’.15  Given their vast political and 
economic differences, the BRICS form a ‘highly heterogeneous club’16 and are in many ways 
‘unlikely bedfellows’.17  Many argue that their divergent interests and mutual distrust inhibit 
collective action and prevent the emerging powers from acting together to challenge the 
dominance of established powers.18  Tensions within this group, it is argued, still outweigh 
tensions between any one member and the US, hindering them from uniting to 
counterbalance American power.19  The conventional wisdom is thus that the failure of the 
emerging powers to ‘articulate a common vision’ and act as a ‘unified political force’ has 
rendered them ‘unable to set the global agenda and discourse’.20 
The case of the WTO, however, challenges this assessment of the behavior and 
impact of the emerging economies.  Contrary to those who argue that the US and other 
Western powers retain their dominance in global institutions and that emerging powers have 
yet to exercise a real voice, in the analysis that follows, I demonstrate that there has been a 
economic order?’ International Affairs 84:3, 2008, pp.485-98; Degaut and Meacham, ‘Do the BRICS still 
matter?’. 
14 Salvatore Babones, ‘American hegemony is here to stay’, National Interest, July/August 2015. 
15 Cynthia Roberts, ‘Challengers or stakeholders? BRICs and the liberal world order’, Polity 42:1, 2010, p.1. 
16 Edward Mansfield, ‘Rising powers in the global economy: issues and questions’, International Studies Review 
16:3, 2014, p.44. 
17 Marion Fourcade, ‘The material and symbolic construction of the BRICs’, Review of International Political 
Economy 20:2, 2013, p.257. 
18 Christian Downie, ‘Global energy governance: do the BRICs have the energy to drive reform?’ International 
Affairs 91:4, 2015, pp.799-812. 
19 Stewart Patrick, ‘The unruled world’, Foreign Affairs 93:1, 2014. 
20 Pant, ‘BRICS fallacy’, p.101-2. 
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significant power shift at the WTO.  The longstanding dominance of the US and other 
advanced-industrialized states and historical marginalization of developing countries, which 
characterized the trade regime for over half a century, have been brought to an end.  Three 
emerging powers – Brazil, India and China – joined the inner-circle of power at the WTO and 
became central players within the institution.  Far from lacking voice or influence, the new 
powers had a profound impact on the Doha Round. 
Furthermore, in contrast to claims that the emerging powers lack unity, I show that 
emerging power alliances have, in fact, played a pivotal role in the dramatic shift in power 
that has occurred at the WTO.  Brazil, India and China have vastly different trade interests 
and objectives.  Yet despite their diverse (and at times conflicting) interests, these three 
countries have a strong collective identity and strategic alliance rooted in their oppositional 
position in relation to the established powers.  The emerging powers needed to ally together, 
and secure the backing of the developing world more broadly, in order to effectively counter 
the traditional dominance of the US and other advanced-industrialized states.  Cooperation 
among Brazil, India and China was crucial to enhancing their power and ability to exert 
influence in the Doha Round.   
For BRICS sceptics, a major criticism is that the concept lumps China together with 
other emerging economies.  As Andrew Cooper states, ‘Based on a variety of measures, 
China is clearly exceptional within the BRICS … [it is] the colossus within the group’.21  In 
economic terms – including the size of its GDP, growth rates, trade volumes and foreign 
reserves – China dwarfs the other BRICS.  The Chinese economy is now not only the second-
largest in the world but larger than all the other BRICS combined.  China is widely seen as 
the real rising power and potential challenger to US hegemony.22  It is often argued that 
21 Cooper, The BRICS. 
22 Jinghan Zeng and Shaun Breslin, ‘China's ‘new type of Great Power relations’: a G2 with Chinese 
characteristics?’ International Affairs 92:4, 2016, pp.773-94; Ian Clark, ‘China and the United States: a 
succession of hegemonies?’ International Affairs 87:1, 2011, pp.13-28. 
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China’s economic capabilities set it apart from other emerging powers and place it in a 
category of its own; in short, that ‘China doesn’t belong in the BRICS’.23  According to Pant, 
‘China’s dominance makes the very idea of a coordinated BRICS response to the changing 
global balance of power something of a non-starter’.24   
Evidence from the WTO, however, challenges this interpretation.  As I show, during 
the Doha Round, China closely coordinated its negotiating efforts with other emerging 
powers.  Alliances with Brazil and India, and with the developing world more broadly, were a 
critical part of China’s strategy, enabling it to better advance its interests and evade threats.  
Some have suggested that China’s ascent makes other BRICS more interested in balancing 
against China rather than bandwagoning with it, driving them into closer alliance with the 
US.25  Yet what occurred at the WTO was precisely the opposite:  Brazil and India actively 
sought cooperation with China, and the emerging powers bandwagoned together as a means 
to enhance their bargaining power vis-à-vis the US and other traditional powers.   
BRICS sceptics have also contested the inclusion of Russia and South Africa, arguing 
that Russia is more accurately a declining rather than rising power and South Africa is too 
small to justify its inclusion.26  To be clear, the objective here is not to defend the BRICS 
category per se.  Certainly, in the case of the WTO, the acronym does not adequately capture 
the power shift that occurred or the specific emerging power alliances that propelled it.  
Russia did not join the WTO until 2012, long after its power structure had been overturned 
and the Doha Round had collapsed.  Brazil, India and China are the sole emerging powers to 
have entered the WTO’s core power structure.  Other emerging powers – such as South 
Africa and Indonesia – contributed to challenging the dominance of the traditional powers, 
but in secondary and supporting roles.  The more accurate acronym to capture the power shift 
23 Graham Allison, ‘China doesn't belong in the BRICS’, The Atlantic, March 26, 2013. 
24 Pant, ‘BRICS fallacy’, p.98. 
25 Pant, ‘BRICS fallacy’. 
26 Hart and Jones, ‘How do rising powers rise?’; Pant, ‘BRICS fallacy’. 
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at the WTO would thus be BIC rather than BRICS.  But the central argument here is that in 
their haste to reject the BRICS concept, critics have been too quick to dismiss the impact of 
emerging powers on global economic governance and the importance of their collaborative 
efforts in driving contemporary power shifts.  At the WTO, alliances among emerging 
powers – specifically Brazil, India and China – contributed to a major shift in power, which, 
as evident in the collapse of the Doha Round, has had a profound and lasting impact on the 
institution. 
As one of the strongest and most important institutions of global economic 
governance,27 the WTO is a critical case for assessing the nature and impact of contemporary 
power shifts.  It is a core pillar of the US-led liberal economic order – the integrated system 
of international organizations, rules and norms constructed during the era of American 
hegemony.28  Moreover, as one of the only economic institutions that makes ‘hard law’ that 
is binding on states and backed by an enforcement mechanism, the WTO has significant 
material consequences for states.  Consequently, the WTO has been a key site of global 
power struggles.  A growing body of scholarship examines the preferences and impact of 
emerging powers at the WTO.29  The present article builds on and extends this literature by 
focusing specifically on relations among the emerging powers.  Within the burgeoning 
literature on contemporary power shifts, the rising powers are most often studied on an 
individual basis (such as in special issues/sections of this journal on China (July 2016), India 
(January 2017), and Brazil (May 2017)), with comparatively little attention to the interaction 
27 David Lake, Hierarchy in international relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
28 John Ikenberry, Liberal leviathan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
29 Valbona Muzaka and Matthew Bishop, ‘Doha stalemate: the end of trade multilateralism?’ Review of 
International Studies 41:2, 2014, pp.383-406; Charalampos Efstathopoulos, ‘Leadership in the WTO: Brazil, 
India and the Doha development agenda’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25:2, 2012, pp.269-93; 
James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson, ‘China threat? Evidence from the WTO’, Journal of World Trade 47:4, 
2013, pp.761-82; Kristen Hopewell, Breaking the WTO: how emerging powers disrupted the neoliberal project 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016); Amrita Narlikar, ‘New powers in the club: the challenges of global 
trade governance’, International Affairs 86:3, 2010, pp.717-28; J.P. Singh, ‘Introduction: emerging powers and 
the WTO’, International Negotiation 21:2, 2016, pp.201-07; Matthew Stephen, ‘Rising regional powers and 
international institutions’, Global Society 26:3, 2012, pp.289-309. 
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among them.  Yet, as scholars have shown, global institutions create possibilities for 
coalition-building, and relations among emerging powers hold the potential for both 
competition and cooperation.30  The contribution of this article lies in highlighting the central 
role of interaction among the emerging powers in driving contemporary power shifts at the 
WTO.  Strategic cooperation and political alignment among China, India and Brazil were 
essential, I argue, to counterbalancing the established powers and overturn prevailing power 
hierarchies.  This analysis draws on field research conducted between 2007 and 2017 at the 
WTO in Geneva, as well as in Beijing, New Delhi, Sao Paulo, Brasilia and Washington, 
involving over 200 interviews with trade negotiators, officials, and representatives of industry 
and NGOs; over 300 hours of direct observation; and extensive documentary research. 
How Emerging Power Alliances Transformed the WTO 
 
As this section will demonstrate, the multilateral trading system has been profoundly 
transformed by the emerging powers.  There has been a fundamental shift in the distribution 
of power, propelled not by these countries acting in isolation but through mutual cooperation 
and alliance-building.  During the Doha Round, the emerging powers invested heavily in 
constructing alliances, with each another and with the rest of the developing world.  Brazil, 
India and China successfully surmounted their disparate trade interests and other sources of 
rivalry in order to cooperate and coordinate their negotiating efforts.  Allegiance among the 
emerging powers served as the foundation for larger developing country coalitions that 
profoundly altered the dynamics and agenda of the Doha Round.  It was these coalitions 
created by, and centered on, the emerging powers – under the leadership of Brazil and India, 
and backed by the weight of China – that   catalyzed power shifts at the WTO.  Moreover, 
beyond their formal bargaining coalitions, as the primary axis of conflict in the Doha Round 
30 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, liberalism and world order: What space for would-be great powers?’ 
International Affairs 82:1, 2006, pp.1-19; Amrita Narlikar, ‘Negotiating the rise of new powers,’ International 
Affairs 89:3, 2013, pp.561-76. 
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came to center on a confrontation between the US and the emerging powers, their informal 
alliance was critical in enabling China, India and Brazil to counterbalance US power. 
Understanding the historical structure of power at the WTO is essential for 
appreciating the magnitude of the shift that has taken place.  For most of its history, the 
multilateral trading system was dominated by the US and a handful of other developed 
countries.  While formally agreements are reached on the basis of consensus, in practice, 
decision-making is heavily shaped by power.31  The most important negotiations take place in 
small group meetings of key states; once agreement is reached among this core group, it is 
extended out to the rest of the membership, allowing a small group of states to establish the 
negotiating agenda and direct the negotiations.  The composition of this elite group is 
determined informally, but it constitutes the inner-circle of power within the WTO – those 
states that are recognized as key players and exercise the most influence over the 
negotiations.  Until recently, agreements were negotiated among ‘the Quad’ – the US, EU, 
Canada and Japan – and imposed upon the rest of the organization’s membership effectively 
as a fait accompli.  The rich countries carved out a trade order that suited their interests, while 
developing countries were excluded from decision-making and their interests marginalized.32   
The launch of the Doha Round in 2001 was driven by the US and EU, over substantial 
opposition from developing countries.33  While subject to coercion to compel their 
participation, developing countries were also promised that Doha would be a ‘development’ 
round, dedicated to redressing historical imbalances in the trading system and advancing their 
needs and interests.  Nonetheless, at its start, the Doha Round looked much like previous 
rounds, with the negotiations centered on ‘the Quad’ and the US and EU firmly in the 
driver’s seat.  Over the course of the round, however, a significant transformation occurred.  
31 Silke Trommer, ‘The WTO in an era of preferential trade agreements’, World Trade Review, 2017. 
32 Muzaka and Bishop, ‘Doha stalemate’; Rorden Wilkinson, What's wrong with the WTO and how to fix it. 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2014). 
33 Amrita Narlikar and Diana Tussie, ‘The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial’, World Economy 27:7, 2004. 
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In 2004, Brazil and India displaced Japan and Canada from the inner-circle of WTO 
negotiations, as the ‘old Quad’ was replaced by the ‘new Quad’ – a series of core negotiating 
groups centered on the US, EU, Brazil, and India.  These four states remained at the heart of 
the negotiations from then on, joined by China in 2008.  Brazil, India and China not only 
joined the high-table of decision-making but emerged as pivotal actors in the Doha Round. 
The establishment of the G20-T – a coalition of developing countries mobilized and 
led by Brazil and India, and backed by China – marked the critical turning point in the 
structure of power at the WTO.34  At the Cancun Ministerial in 2003 – an important 
milestone in the Doha Round, when negotiations shifted to laying down the specific terms of 
the deal – Brazil and India created the G20-T to block the US-EU proposal on agriculture and 
demand reductions in rich country agricultural subsidies.  The G20-T produced a ‘tectonic 
shift’ at the WTO, to quote one Ambassador, launching Brazil and India into the inner-circle 
of negotiations, as key players who were considered essential to securing a deal.35  The G20-
T became a major force in shaping the agenda of the Doha Round, with the negotiating texts 
directly reflecting many of its objectives.36  
A second coalition centered on the emerging powers had an equally important impact 
on the Doha negotiations:  the G33.  India is the leading force behind the group, with 
significant support from China, and Indonesia acting as its formal coordinator.  The G33 
sought to limit the degree of agricultural market opening required of developing countries, 
advocating a ‘special products’ (SPs) exemption to allow developing countries to shield some 
products from tariff cuts and a ‘special safeguard mechanism’ (SSM) to allow tariff increases 
in response to an import surge.  Despite opposition from the US and other developed 
countries, the G33 succeeded in securing agreement that both measures would be part of any 
34 Denoted G20-Trade (G20-T) to avoid confusion with the G20 Leaders Summit. Efstathopoulos, ‘Leadership 
in WTO’; Hopewell, Breaking the WTO; Narlikar and Tussie, ‘The G20’. 
35 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
36 Hopewell, Breaking the WTO, p.84. 
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final Doha agreement.37  The precise design of the SSM grew increasingly controversial in 
the later stages of the round and became a focal issue at the 2008 Mini-Ministerial.  It was 
then China joined the inner-circle of negotiations, invited by the US, which assumed China 
would side with it and increase pressure on India to capitulate.  Instead, however, China 
backed India, enabling it to hold out against US pressure.  
It was the underlying alliance among the emerging powers that made the G20-T and 
G33 possible and turned them into a potent force at the WTO.38  In a marked departure from 
the past, when developing countries had minimal influence over the shape of GATT/WTO 
agreements, coalitions centered on the emerging powers had a significant impact on the Doha 
negotiations and the content of the prospective agreement.  Beyond the G20-T and G33, India 
mobilized developing country opposition to investment, competition and government 
procurement, successfully forcing those issues off the negotiating table.  Brazil and India, 
along with South Africa, led developing countries in securing exemptions to WTO 
intellectual property rules for public health and access to medicines.  Their opposition also 
prevented the US and EU from seeking expanded IP protections (‘TRIPs-Plus’) in the Doha 
Round.  In addition, Brazil, India, and South Africa were central players in the NAMA-11 
coalition on manufactured goods, which secured important concessions to the defensive 
concerns of developing countries.39  
Developing country coalitions based on the emerging powers were thus a key force in 
transforming power relations at the WTO.  For Brazil and India, which lack the economic 
heft of other major powers, including China, their mobilization and leadership of coalitions 
was critical in enabling them to gain a seat in the inner-circle and play a significant agenda-
37 Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Symbolic power in the WTO (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Matias 
Margulis, ‘The Regime Complex for Food Security’, Global Governance 19:1, 2013. 
38 Hopewell, Breaking the WTO. 
39 WTO, ‘Revised draft NAMA modalities’, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3/2008. 
12 
 
                                                 
setting role in the Doha Round.40  Although a follower rather than a leader, these coalitions 
were equally important for China.  Hyperbole about China’s position as a ‘dragon’ aside, 
even the country seen by many as the strongest among the emerging powers required partners 
to negotiate shifting power dynamics at the WTO. 
Even a Dragon Needs Allies 
While China willingly left the leadership role to Brazil and India, it still sought the 
benefits and protection of developing world alliances.  China was a key member of both 
pivotal coalitions – the G20-T and the G33 – with its economic might adding considerably to 
the weight of these alliances.  As one negotiator stated, China let Brazil and India ‘do the 
fighting’ while providing ‘support from behind’.41  When the Doha Round began, many 
expected China to side with the advanced-industrialized states, given its export-oriented trade 
interests.  Instead, however, as the round progressed, China chose to align itself with Brazil, 
India and the developing world.  To quote a US official:  ‘In many ways, at the WTO, China 
has the same interests as developed countries:  market access to large emerging economies, 
developing countries.  It could have gone two ways:  we could have co-opted China, but 
instead Brazil and India did’.42   
The particular demands on China oriented its choice of allies.  As the world’s leading 
exporter, China had an interest in strengthening trade rules and reducing barriers to its 
exports.  Yet China’s economic size represented both a strength and liability at the WTO.  Its 
large and rapidly growing economy made China a target for states seeking greater access to 
its market – a concern for China given that the liberalization undertaken for its WTO 
accession in 2001 left it with considerably lower tariff bindings than most developing 
countries.  Many states also viewed the rapid expansion of China’s exports and industrial 
40 Efstathopoulos, ‘Leadership in WTO’; Hopewell, Breaking the WTO. 
41 Interview, New Delhi, March 2010. 
42 Interview, Beijing, July 2009. 
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capacity as a threat.  Consequently, China potentially faced both demands that it open its 
market and efforts to constrain its exports, creating significant potential vulnerabilities. 
China identified the established powers as its primary threat.  As a Chinese negotiator 
indicated: 
It is our position that the greatest source of pressure on China in this round 
will come from the rich OECD countries.  So our strategy has been to pay 
more attention to how our unity with developing countries could be 
strengthened.43  
 
The threat of being pushed to undertake greater liberalization commitments caused China to 
stress its developing country status and prioritize alliances with other developing countries.  
As a rival negotiator stated, ‘They are aware of the risk and do everything they need to avoid 
it’.44  China actively sought to build allies to strengthen its position and help guard against 
such threats, working to ally itself with the developing world, emphasizing its solidarity with 
other developing countries, and using its membership in coalitions like the G20 and G33 to 
pursue its interests while avoiding being singled out and targeted.   
At the WTO, China cultivated the image of itself as a developing country like any 
other, struggling in solidarity against the rich countries.  To quote a rival negotiator, China 
‘will always speak out for developing countries, LDCs, SVEs [small, vulnerable economies], 
etc., because that projects that they’re supportive.  But of course they’re crushing these 
countries’.45  Since it is in China’s interest that the primary line of division be drawn between 
developing and developed countries, it actively worked to reinforce this structure of identities 
and alliances at the WTO.  One negotiator explained:  China is ‘extremely careful with being 
close to the African countries and the most vulnerable countries, focusing on developing 
country solidarity against the industrial countries, avoiding it being put as emerging versus 
43 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
44 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
45 Interview, Geneva, April 2009. 
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developing countries’.46  A Chinese official stated:  ‘It’s not always that way – that issues are 
drawn on a South-North line – but on most issues, yes, it is a South-North confrontation and 
China naturally sides with the South.  This is only natural, otherwise China would be 
criticized as a traitor’.47  The strategic – and potentially transitory – purpose of China’s 
alliance with developing countries is signaled in the comments of one of its negotiators, who 
explained with a laugh:  ‘This may change in future decades, but we still have to hold high 
the banner of development for this round’.48  China therefore sought to be treated like other 
developing countries and to shield itself within coalitions like the G20-T and the G33.  
Alliances have thus been critical for each of the emerging powers – even China with its 
considerable economic might.   
United by a Shared Threat 
The emerging powers joined forces in the Doha Round, working in concert through 
the G20-T and the G33.  The underlying partnership among Brazil, India and China that 
formed the basis for these coalitions was potentially surprising, given their divergent trade 
interests.  Brazil, for example, is a leading agricultural exporter and defined its primary 
interest in the Doha Round as seeking agricultural trade liberalization to expand markets for 
its exports, while India and China are both resistant to liberalization, due to their large 
populations of peasant farmers vulnerable to import competition.  Conversely, in 
manufactured goods, as an export powerhouse, China has a keen interest in reducing trade 
barriers, while Brazil and India want to protect their markets from imports.  Despite their 
differences, the emerging powers recognized the strategic value of allying.  Although not 
natural allies based on their trade interests, the emerging powers became allies to counter the 
perceived threat they faced from the established powers. 
46 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
47 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
48 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
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Of particular threat to the emerging powers was the issue of ‘differentiation’ among 
developing countries.  A key promise of the Doha Round was that developing countries 
would be granted ‘special and differential treatment’ (SDT), in the form of reduced 
liberalization commitments, greater flexibilities and exemptions, and longer implementation 
periods.  During the round, however, the US and other advanced-industrialized states 
increasingly sought to restrict China, India and Brazil’s access to SDT, arguing that the large 
emerging economies have ‘graduated’ from developing country status.  The emerging powers 
staunchly maintain that they are entitled to the SDT promised to developing countries.  
China, India and Brazil consider themselves developing countries and view their access to 
SDT as a core part of the development commitment of the Doha Round.  Indeed, for China, 
as one of its former negotiators stressed, ‘a condition we laid down as part of our accession to 
the WTO was that we would join as a developing country’.49  Thus, in the words of their 
negotiators, the emerging powers ‘strictly oppose any talk on differentiation’ and ‘[Their] 
line is clear:  SDT should apply equally to all developing countries’.50  The threat of 
differentiation and being pushed to undertake greater liberalization, reducing their policy 
space and potentially their scope for future economic development, provided a powerful 
inducement for the emerging powers to ally despite their otherwise disparate interests.  In 
other words, the emerging powers were united by a common external threat, which proved 
formidable enough to override their differences. 
For the emerging powers, collaboration was thus less a choice than ‘a compulsion’, to 
quote one negotiator.51  The alliance between China, India and Brazil was far from free of 
tension:  negotiators described it as ‘a very delicate embrace where you cannot leave each 
other’ and ‘a coalition of the unwilling’.52  However, while the emerging powers, along with 
49 Interview, Geneva, July 2017. 
50 Interviews, Geneva, July 2017. 
51 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
52 Interviews, Geneva, May 2009. 
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many of their developing country allies, were undoubtedly wary and suspicious of one 
another, they were even more wary of the US and other established powers, which they 
continued to view as the primary threat in multilateral trade negotiations.  The emerging 
powers are acutely aware of the dangers of isolation, which in the past has left them 
vulnerable to being overpowered by the US and other advanced-industrialized states and 
forced to concede to their demands.  As one Ambassador stated:  
If you look at the balance of forces at the WTO, if you have India, China and 
Brazil, you can do anything, but if you have just one or two of them….  We 
have different interests and economic realities and goals in the negotiations.   
But there’s a common perception among Brazil, India and China that if we 
don’t manage our differences and act isolated, we’re easy prey.  If Brazil, 
India and China don’t work together, we don’t stand a chance.53  
 
Even China needs such alliances, according to one of its negotiators:   
because of our bitter experience of negotiating bilaterally with the US [during 
China’s WTO accession].  The US always got what it wanted.  Our prospects 
of winning are higher if we are with other developing countries and not alone.  
The US is still the superpower – the world’s biggest economy.  In a one-on-
one setting, the US will most always win.54   
 
Through allying with Brazil and India, he continued, ‘it is no longer one-to-one, but the US 
versus a group of countries.  The US is the big elephant, but we now have a group of wolves – 
then we have a chance’.  All of the emerging powers, even China, recognized that they lacked 
sufficient power acting alone – making the decision to ally, as one negotiator put it, ‘a clear 
strategic move’. 55 
The Price of Alliances 
 
The importance of their alliances is signaled in the costs the emerging powers were 
willing to incur to construct and maintain them.  Given their divergent trade interests, the 
alliances formed by the emerging powers required significant compromises.  In the case of 
Brazil, for example, developing countries, particularly large and rapidly growing economies 
53 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
54 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
55 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
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like China and India, represent the primary markets for its agricultural exports.  Instead of 
pushing those countries to reduce their trade barriers, however, Brazil made a strategic 
decision to sacrifice its market access demands and refrain from pressing other developing 
countries to open their markets, in order to make its partnership with India and China 
possible, enable the creation of the G20-T as a unified political force, and secure support for 
its leadership.  As one Brazilian negotiator put it, ‘yes, on market access we definitely hit the 
brakes hard’.56  For the sake of the G20-T and its broader alliances, Brazil showed itself 
willing to accept a weaker tariff reduction formula and extensive flexibilities for developing 
countries, which significantly reduced its potential gains in those markets.  Brazil also 
supported India, China and the G33 on the SSM and SPs, despite the negative commercial 
implications for its own exporters. 
Similarly, as the largest exporter of manufactured goods, China would be among the 
biggest beneficiaries from increased access to developing country markets, especially large 
emerging economies like Brazil and India, where its exports face high tariffs.  Yet China was 
willing to accept a weaker tariff reduction formula and exemptions for developing countries, 
limiting their market opening at the expense of its own exports.  As one negotiator stated, 
‘The idea that increased flexibilities are good for developing countries in general is bullshit.  
Those carve-outs hurt us [competitive producers]…  We’d be happier if the additional carve-
outs were kept in check’.57  Nonetheless, China was willing to bear this cost for the sake of 
its alliances.  As a Chinese negotiator explained:  
We face divide and rule strategies of the developed countries.  China has been 
adhering to this principle of unity.  China could have been more aggressive in 
seeking market access to developing countries, but our strategy has been to 
show solidarity with other developing countries.58 
 
56 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
57 Interview, Geneva, April 2009. 
58 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
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Consequently, China and the other emerging powers steadfastly refrained from pressing other 
developing countries – including each other – for liberalization.  In the words of an Indian 
representative, ‘it doesn’t make sense to pursue market access to developing countries 
because that’s the block that’s going to stand with you against the industrialized countries’.59  
The emerging powers thus sacrificed the pursuit of significant export interests in order to 
construct and maintain their alliances. 
The Established Powers Strike Back 
 
The importance of coalitions in enhancing the power of Brazil, India and China was 
also evident in the concerted efforts of the traditional powers to undermine and break their 
alliances.  The US, in particular, pursued an active ‘divide and rule’ strategy.  The US went 
on the attack against the G20-T, for example, publically deriding the group and using strong-
arm tactics in an attempt to force it to dismantle.60  The US threatened to withdraw from 
negotiations for bilateral and regional free trade agreements with several countries unless 
they abandoned the G20-T, which led five of the original coalition members – Columbia, 
Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica – to drop out.  Nevertheless, the G20-T was 
ultimately able to withstand such pressure, remain intact and replace its lost members. 
The US also sought to convince poor countries that they shared common interests and 
should support the US in pushing the emerging economies to open their markets.  According 
to the President’s Trade Agenda, for instance: 
The remarkable growth of emerging economies like China, India, and Brazil 
has fundamentally changed the landscape…  The US, already among the most 
open markets in the world, has been frank about the importance of obtaining 
increased access to these markets.  Access to emerging economies is also vital 
for the poorest countries that have been a particular focus of the Doha 
negotiations.  Developing country tariffs are four times higher than those of 
developed countries, and the poorest countries already have largely open 
59 Interview, New Delhi, March 2010. 
60 James Scott, ‘The role of southern intellectuals in contemporary trade governance’, New Political Economy 
20:5, 2015. 
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access to major developed economies, like the US, through trade preference 
programs.61 
 
Most developing countries, however, remained skeptical of US efforts to turn them against 
the emerging powers.  As one US negotiator acknowledged, ‘developing countries mistrust 
us.’62  Having been pressed into an unfavorable agreement by the US in the Uruguay Round, 
many developing countries continued to view the US as their principal threat in the Doha 
Round.   
The US also used the issue of differentiation in an effort to sow divisions and weaken 
support for the emerging powers.  Over the course of the Doha Round, the draft negotiating 
texts came to be packed with a long list of exemptions for various categories of developing 
countries – including LDCs, SVEs, ‘very recently-acceded members’, ‘small low-income 
RAMs with economies in transition’, ‘paragraph 6’ countries, and even individual members – 
allowing them to undertake fewer liberalization commitments, granting them longer 
implementation periods, or exempting them entirely.63  Negotiators underscore the tactical 
purpose that this served:   
if you look at the NAMA [manufactured goods] text, it has flexibilities for all 
these different groups of developing countries.  In terms of a negotiating 
approach, it can be useful to provide those flexibilities because it takes those 
countries out of the negotiating equation.  What you’re left with are the Brazil, 
India and Chinas of this world.  It’s all to isolate them.64   
 
Another negotiator bluntly summed this up as ‘bribing the little guys’ to abandon their 
support for the emerging powers.65  From the perspective of the US, the myriad exemptions 
granted to smaller developing countries were a small price to pay:  as an American negotiator 
stated, ‘we don’t really care about those.  We care about the advanced developing 
61 US, ‘President's trade agenda’, 2011. 
62 Interview, Geneva, July 2017. 
63 WTO, ‘Rev.3 NAMA modalities’; WTO, ‘Revised draft agriculture modalities’, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4/2008. 
64 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
65 Interview, Geneva, July 2016. 
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countries.’66  The US sought to isolate the large emerging economies in an effort to render 
them more vulnerable and extract greater concessions.  But this strategy proved unsuccessful:  
although developing countries willingly accepted the carrots offered by the US and other 
traditional powers, this failed to lessen support for the emerging powers. 
Alliances Endure Despite Tensions 
     
Given the diverse interests of developing countries, the alliances constructed by the 
emerging powers were not without friction.  Negotiators indicate that it is easier to manage 
such tensions and maintain unity in the early stages of negotiations, but suppressed conflicts 
inevitably surface as negotiations move closer to a prospective agreement.  As one stated:  
‘At the beginning you have very romantic and idealistic proposals that everyone is on board 
with, positions are very broad and it is very easy to be coordinated’.  Yet as negotiations 
proceed toward an ‘end-game’ of nailing down the specific terms and provisions of the 
agreement, ‘it becomes increasingly difficult to get a uniform position on any issue’.67  Clear 
stress lines emerged within the emerging powers’ coalitions at the 2008 Mini-Ministerial, 
when it appeared negotiations could be approaching a conclusion.  At that time, many 
developing countries expressed dissatisfaction with the positions taken by Brazil, India and 
China, threatening to destabilize both the G20-T and G33.   
In the G20-T, criticism of Brazil’s leadership erupted from multiple sides.  Until then, 
the group had focused on its key area of convergence – rich country agricultural subsidies – 
but largely set aside the contentious question of how much developing countries should be 
required to open their markets, embodied in the SSM and SPs.  With its membership of both 
importers and exporters, it was feared that trying to reach consensus on a common G20-T 
position would split the group apart.  However, when the SSM emerged as the central issue at 
66 Interview, Geneva, June 2009. 
67 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
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the 2008 Mini-Ministerial, divisions in the group flared into open criticism of Brazil’s 
leadership:  countries with vulnerable agriculture sectors like India and China complained 
that Brazil had abandoned them in their fight for the SSM, while exporters like Argentina and 
Uruguay complained that Brazil should have fought harder against India and China on the 
SSM.  Even on agricultural subsidies, disagreement broke out within the G20-T when Brazil 
indicated it was willing to accept the US subsidy cap proposed by the WTO Director-
General, displeasing countries demanding further reductions.  Countries like Argentina, 
Venezuela, and South Africa were also dissatisfied with the terms Brazil was willing to 
accept on manufactured products, resenting Brazil’s willingness to trade off industrials for 
gains in agriculture.  
Similar tensions strained the unity of the G33 and support for India and China as the 
coalition’s representatives.  While India and China stood up to the US on the SSM, 
negotiators report that many G33 members wanted to show more flexibility.  This generated 
resentment towards India and criticism that it was pursuing its own interests to the detriment 
of other G33 members.  In the words of one negotiator, ‘it was dog-eat-dog at that stage’.68  
Tensions flared again within the G33 during the 2013 Bali Ministerial, when negotiations 
threatened to breakdown due to conflict between the US and India over the issue of food 
stockholding.69   
In these pivotal moments, many coalition members feared that Brazil, India and China 
would simply pursue their own interests.  As negotiators complained, ‘no two countries are 
alike at the WTO’ and ultimately ‘every country is negotiating for their own interests’.70  
Other developing countries were frustrated at being excluded from the inner-circle of 
negotiations and forced to rely on being represented by Brazil, India and China.  
68 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
69 Rorden Wilkinson, Erin Hannah and James Scott, ‘The WTO in Bali’, Third World Quarterly 35:6, 2014. 
70 Interviews, Geneva, April-May 2009. 
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Nevertheless, their coalitions did not break.  Both the emerging powers and their allies were 
keenly aware that their bargaining power and ability to defend their interests vis-à-vis the US 
and EU would be substantially weakened were their coalitions to crumble – as one stated, 
‘our strength lies in the group’ – and therefore actively worked to patch over differences and 
maintain unity.71 
Impact of the Emerging Powers on the Doha Round 
 
Working in close cooperation, Brazil, India and China drove a substantial shift in 
power in the multilateral trading system, bringing an end to the longstanding dominance of 
the US and other advanced-industrialized states and making their trade policies a central 
focus of the Doha Round.  As a result of the emerging powers and their coalitions, especially 
the G20-T and the G33, the dynamics of the round changed profoundly.  The G20-T’s attack 
on rich country agriculture subsidies prompted a dramatic shift in roles:  as one negotiator 
stated, ‘at the start of this round, the US saw itself in an offensive position.  It had no idea it 
would be a target...  But [it became] the key focus of the negotiations’.72  For the first time, 
the US found itself isolated and on the defensive, while new powers from the developing 
world assumed the role of demandeurs. 
Brazil, India and China came to have a significant impact on the Doha Round, evident 
both in their success in blocking the traditional powers and in advancing their own 
initiatives.73  Many of the US and other established powers’ objectives for the round were 
thwarted, including:  labor and environmental standards; competition, investment and 
government procurement; expanded TRIPs-Plus intellectual property protections; sectoral 
negotiations on manufactured goods; and efforts to force the large emerging economies to 
undertake more aggressive liberalization.  Simultaneously, activism by the emerging powers 
71 Interview, Geneva, March 2009. 
72 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
73 Hopewell, Breaking the WTO. 
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succeeded in putting issues of importance to developing countries at the center of the 
negotiations and obtaining significant concessions, including SDT, agriculture subsidies, SPs, 
the SSM, food stockholding, and TRIPs and public health.  Across the negotiations, 
developing countries secured substantial SDT, with weaker tariff-reduction formulas and 
substantial flexibilities, limiting the degree of liberalization required from them.74  
Compared to the Uruguay Round – when developing countries were pressured into an 
unfavorable agreement against their interests – the change in the Doha Round was 
profound.75  Collectively, Brazil, India and China demonstrated the power to resist an 
unbalanced deal as well as to successfully make meaningful demands of developed countries.  
The US and other advanced-industrialized states were placed in a largely reactive position – 
repeatedly on the back foot, forced to respond to the demands of developing countries, while 
having limited success in advancing their own.  As one Secretariat official stated, ‘the US has 
not been leading this organization in quite a while’.76  This rebalancing of power 
fundamentally shifted the terms of the prospective Doha agreement and the balance of 
concessions among states necessary to secure a deal.   
By the 2008 Mini-Ministerial, the US – especially members of Congress and its 
business and farm lobby groups – had come to view the proposed Doha agreement as unfair 
and unbalanced against the US.77  Based on the deal that had taken shape – with what they 
complained were weak tariff-reduction formulas and excessive flexibilities for the large 
emerging economies – these actors argued that the US would be required to significantly cut 
its tariffs, as well as its agricultural subsidies, while gaining insufficient new access to foreign 
markets.  As one US negotiator put it, ‘we’d be giving everything and getting nothing’.78  
74 WTO, ‘Rev.3 NAMA modalities’; WTO, ‘Rev.4 agriculture modalities’. 
75 Muzaka and Bishop, ‘Doha stalemate’. 
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The core complaint of the US was that the prospective agreement did not require enough of 
the large emerging economies – China, India and Brazil – who benefit from the SDT that 
they played a major role in securing for developing countries.79   
The US therefore sought to ‘rebalance’ the deal by pressing the large emerging 
economies to undertake greater liberalization.80  Its efforts centered on pressing these 
countries to participate in ‘sectorals’ (aggressive liberalization in specific industrial sectors to 
reduce tariffs to zero) in two key areas of US competitive advantage – chemicals and 
industrial machinery.  Sectorals were effectively an add-on to the core agreement, pushed by 
the US as a means to extract additional market opening from the large emerging economies.  
In addition, the US pressed the emerging economies to commit to not using their SP 
exemptions in agriculture against specific products of export interest to the US (such as 
cotton, wheat and corn), in order to guarantee the US market access gains in those areas.  
In effect, as the US was increasingly pressed to liberalize its market in the Doha 
Round, it responded by ratcheting up its demands for concessions from the emerging powers.  
China, India and Brazil, however, viewed the US’s heightened demands as unfair and 
unjustified.81  The emerging powers emphasized that the Doha ‘Development’ Round had 
promised to deliver meaningful gains to the developing world.  A core aspect of the Doha 
mandate was the principle that developing countries, including China, India and Brazil, 
would not be required to engage in an equal exchange of concessions with the advanced-
industrialized states, but instead that the final agreement would be reached on the basis of 
‘less than full reciprocity’ in favor of developing countries.  From the perspective of the 
emerging powers, the US was now trying to change the terms of the deal by seeking less than 
full reciprocity in its own favor, in clear violation of the development mandate of the round. 
79 US, ‘President’s trade agenda’. 
80 US, ‘President’s trade agenda’. 
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After years of repeated breakdown, the Doha Round reached a permanent impasse in 
2008.  The Ministerial ostensibly broke down due to a skirmish between the US, on one hand, 
and India and China, on the other, over the SSM.  However, the deeper source of conflict was 
the US’s desire to ‘rebalance’ the deal by securing greater access for its agriculture and 
manufactured goods to the markets of the large emerging economies, particularly China.  
With the old and new powers unable to reach agreement, the negotiations became 
deadlocked.  As the WTO Director-General acknowledged, at the core of the Doha stalemate 
was a dispute over ‘the balance in contributions and responsibilities between emerging and 
advanced economies’.82  In short, the SDT extended to the emerging powers in the draft texts 
of the proposed Doha agreement made the agreement untenable to the US.  The US has 
refused to commit to liberalization in the Doha Round unless greater liberalization is required 
of the major emerging economies.  Yet the emerging powers argue that, as developing 
countries, they are entitled to SDT and should not be required to make further concessions to 
appease the US.  With these two sides relatively evenly matched, neither was able to 
overpower and impose its will upon the other.   
The unfettered power of the US and other advanced-industrialized states in the 
multilateral trading system has been curtailed by the rise of China, India and Brazil.  For the 
first time, no one country, or block of countries, is dominant and can dictate outcomes.  The 
negotiations were officially declared at an impasse in 2011, and the 2015 Nairobi Ministerial 
Declaration openly acknowledged that many members now consider the round dead.    The 
issue of differentiation – whether the emerging powers should be entitled to SDT or forced to 
engage in a more equal exchange of concessions with the US – lies at the heart of the Doha 
Round collapse.  As one participant summed up, ‘the issue of differentiation became the 
82 WTO, ‘Chair's concluding statement’, WT/MIN(11)/11/2011. 
26 
 
                                                 
central stumbling block in the Doha Round, across virtually all areas of the negotiations.’83  
And differentiation – how emerging powers should be classified and treated in multilateral 
trade negotiations – has remained the overarching source of conflict since the collapse of the 
round. Since the breakdown of the round, there has been an effort to salvage the negotiating 
function of the WTO by attempting to hive off smaller, more specific and seemingly less 
controversial issues where it may be easier for states to reach agreement.  At the 2013 Bali 
Ministerial, states reached agreement on trade facilitation, food stockholding, and select 
issues related to SDT for LDCs.84  However, even that limited package proved highly 
contentious and its enactment was nearly derailed by persistent conflict between the US and 
India over food stockholding.85  The 2015 Nairobi Ministerial produced agreement on 
agricultural export subsidies, certain LDC issues, and expansion of the plurilateral 
Information Technology Agreement involving a subset of WTO members.86  This shift to 
narrowly-focused, piecemeal deals is a far cry from the comprehensive trade round originally 
envisioned for the Doha Round and the WTO’s intended function of continuing to craft 
broad-based universal deals through a single-undertaking.  And even with a piecemeal 
approach, there have been few areas where states are able to reach agreement, primarily due 
to persistent conflict between the US and the emerging powers over whether the large 
emerging economies should be entitled to SDT.  Most recently, for example, while the issues 
of agricultural subsidies and fisheries subsidies were identified as priority negotiating areas 
for the 2017 Buenos Aires Ministerial, meaningful progress has been hampered by the same 
ongoing dispute over differentiation and SDT for the emerging powers.87   
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Many of the coalitions that characterized the Doha Round, such as the G20-T, have 
become less salient following the round’s collapse.  Yet the emerging powers remain broadly 
aligned, carefully maintaining their allegiance through a delicate process of mutual 
accommodation, while refraining from publicly challenging or criticizing one another.  Two 
of the most prominent and controversial issues under negotiation post-Doha have been the 
SSM and food stockholding.  Here, India and China remain allied, with backing from other 
G33 members, against the US.  And, strikingly, Brazil, despite its export interests, has 
supported India and China on both issues.  As a Brazilian negotiator stated:  ‘we have our 
own interests, but we see these as legitimate issues for China and India, so overall we’ve been 
supportive of what they are seeking to achieve’.88  He frankly acknowledged that Brazil’s 
motives are strategic:  ‘We’re trying to navigate without creating problems with China and 
India.  The issue that continues to unite us is graduation, so we’re still close allies.  We try to 
manage this carefully – confrontation between us would not be good.’  Another negotiator 
echoed this:   
We have two overriding common concerns – development and SDT.  When 
it comes to SDT, we remain united on not having that core principle 
undermined.  Whenever there is an attack on the development component of 
the round, there is a strong sense of solidarity, a reaction of sticking 
together.89  
 
The emerging powers are acutely aware that they remain prime targets of the US, and this 
external threat – of being forced to accept differentiation and denied access to special and 
differential treatment – continues to knit them together.  In order to guard against the 
perpetual risk of being overpowered by the US, the emerging powers thus, as one 
representative put it, ‘still try as much as possible to stay as one.’90  Consequently, while 
tensions among the emerging powers were exacerbated by frustration at the breakdown of 
88 Interview, Geneva, July 2016. 
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round, as one negotiator summed up, ‘It’s not exactly love and harmony, but it’s certainly not 
open dissent either’.91  The strategic alignment among the emerging powers that 
characterized the Doha Round has proven durable and enduring. 
Conclusion 
An analysis of power shifts at the WTO challenges the increasingly prevalent view 
that the rise of the BRICS was merely an illusion or a fallacy, hyped by market actors to sell 
investment opportunities.  Instead, I have shown that Brazil, India and China emerged as a 
major political force at the WTO and have had a profound and lasting impact on global trade 
governance.  Through mutual cooperation and their broader developing world alliances, the 
emerging powers transformed the Doha Round into a North-South battle.  Emerging power 
alliances were critical in altering the structure of power within the WTO and enabling the 
emerging powers to exercise influence in the Doha Round.  The emerging powers cooperated 
to a far greater extent than anticipated based on their disparate trade interests.  In contrast to 
expectations of conflict and discord among the emerging powers, Brazil, India and China 
exhibited a remarkable degree of collaboration.  Aligning together to counter the traditional 
powers, the emerging powers were highly successful in accommodating their differences, 
coordinating their positions wherever possible, and managing inevitable tensions within their 
relationship.  This analysis has underscored the centrality of conflict over differentiation and 
access to SDT, as the issue that both fundamentally unites the emerging powers and 
ultimately lies at the root of the impasse in the Doha Round.  Moreover, this central axis of 
conflict has remained persistent and carried over into the post-Doha era of negotiations. 
The case of the WTO suggests that power shifts – specifically the confrontation 
between the emerging powers and the American hegemon – are having a profound impact on 
the global economic order.  The collapse of the Doha Round represents a breakdown in the 
91 Interview, Geneva, February 2016. 
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core negotiating function of the WTO.  Until now, the multilateral trading system worked 
through successive rounds of negotiations to progressively and steadily push forward the 
liberalization of international trade and the integration of global markets.  Yet after eight 
successful trade rounds since the 1940s, each increasingly comprehensive and inclusive in 
nature, the failure of Doha brought this process to a halt.  While the WTO’s existing rules 
remain in force and subject to its dispute settlement mechanism, the continued expansion of 
global trade rules through the negotiation of comprehensive multilateral trade agreements has 
been brought to a standstill.  Contemporary power shifts should not be underestimated:  they 
have disrupted the functioning of one of the core institutions of the liberal economic order 
created under US hegemony. 
While this study has been limited to the WTO, there is reason to believe that alliance-
building among the emerging powers is far from unique to this case.  Research in other areas 
of global economic governance – from the G20 and the BRICS Summit to the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank – suggests that the 
emerging powers are successfully using mutual cooperation as a strategy to enhance their 
influence and challenge US/Western dominance in multiple forums.92  This is not to imply 
that the emerging powers will always ally, or that the dynamics of their alliances will be 
identical in other areas of governance.  The extent of their cooperation, its dynamics and 
impacts may vary in other cases.  An important avenue for future research is thus to engage in 
comparative analysis of emerging power alliances across different areas of global economic 
governance. 
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